open to on-site · hybrid · remote v2026.09

Noureddine Bellounis

↳ bellounis.com · 0x890

Offensive Security + Red Team Lead + AI & LLM Security
both sides of the wire

Thirteen years breaking into banks, oil & gas operators, carriers and ministries — and then building the SIEM, the detections and the Zero Trust perimeter those attacks get measured against. Now red-teaming production LLM and agent deployments, where the prompt is the new perimeter.

  • Red Team & Adversary Emulation
  • AI / LLM Red-Teaming
  • AD & ADCS Attack Paths
  • Detection Engineering
  • Zero Trust Architecture
ninou@bellounis — ~/redteam — zsh branch main uptime 13y clock --:--:--
VULNS DISCLOSED150+crit / high
MEAN TIME TO DOMAIN ADMINdaysnot weeks
ATT&CK-MAPPED DETECTIONSSigma500+ hosts
LLM GUARDRAILS BYPASSEDmostin scope
press ~ or click to open the interactive shell · try help
— DEEP EXPERTISE

Both sides of the wire,
not just one report.

Three layers of work — the attack path, the AI attack surface, and the detections that catch both. Each one backed by delivered engagements and production infrastructure.

  • ↳ Full-scope adversary simulation through to domain compromise
  • ↳ LLM & agent red-teaming mapped to OWASP LLM Top 10 · MITRE ATLAS
  • ↳ Purple-team replays that ship as Sigma detections, not slides
01
Active DirectoryADCSKerberosPurple Team

Attack paths & the detections that catch them

see engagements ↓

A representative kill chain from a regulated-environment engagement, anonymised. Click each hop: the red side is what the operator did, the blue side is the telemetry and rule that would have caught it. Every engagement ends with these detections handed to the client's SOC.

02
LLMAgentsRAGOWASP LLM Top 10MITRE ATLAS

AI & LLM red-teaming

AI-powered SOC ↓

Adversarial testing of live LLM and agentic systems — direct and indirect prompt injection through retrieval corpora, tool- and function-calling abuse, guardrail bypass chains, system-prompt and training-data leakage, unbounded consumption. Findings mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS so security and ML teams share one vocabulary.

ai-redteam · run.log illustrative
$ airt run --target prod-assistant --suite owasp-llm-2025 --atlas
[LLM01] prompt-injection.direct ............ 12 cases   3 FAIL
[LLM01] prompt-injection.indirect.rag ......  18 cases   5 FAIL
[LLM02] sensitive-info.pii-egress ..........   6 cases   1 FAIL
[LLM06] excessive-agency.tool-abuse ........   9 cases   2 FAIL
[LLM07] system-prompt-leakage ..............   4 cases   0 FAIL
[LLM10] unbounded-consumption ..............   5 cases   1 FAIL
mapped   ATLAS AML.T0051 · AML.T0054 · AML.T0057 · AML.T0048
report   findings.pdf — 12 findings · 4 critical · PoC per finding · retest plan
03
SigmaWazuhElasticATT&CKZero Trust

Detection engineering & the perimeter

SOC from zero ↓

Stood up a SOC from nothing — SIEM over 500+ endpoints, ATT&CK-mapped Sigma content, triage workflow and IR runbooks — and replaced the legacy VPN with identity-aware Zero Trust access. The rule below is the blue half of hop 02 in the attack path above.

rules/kerberoasting_rc4_tgs.yml .yml
title: Kerberoasting — RC4 TGS requests from user accounts
status: production
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4769
    TicketEncryptionType: '0x17'        # RC4-HMAC
    Status: '0x0'
  filter:
    ServiceName|endswith: '$'           # machine accounts
    ServiceName: 'krbtgt'
  condition: selection and not filter
level: high
tags: [attack.credential_access, attack.t1558.003]
— SELECTED ENGAGEMENTS

Anonymised. Real.
NDA-safe by design.

Client names stay out of it — that is the job. The sectors, the techniques and the regulatory frames are exactly what was delivered.

Energy · Critical InfraFull-scope red team

National oil & gas operator

Multi-week adversary simulation across the corporate estate and the IT/OT boundary. Phishing foothold escalated through Active Directory to domain compromise; demonstrated reachability of engineering workstations and supervisory segments across a flat Purdue-model boundary.

  • Phishing
  • AD → DA
  • Purdue boundary
  • IEC 62443
  • NIS2
Finance · RegulatedThreat-led · assumed breach

Tier-1 banking group

External perimeter and assumed-breach operations. Chained Kerberoasting, ADCS certificate-template abuse (ESC1/ESC8) and delegation misconfigurations into privileged access; assessed segmentation around payment-processing scope. CVSS/CWE reporting, executive risk narrative, remediation workshops and full retest evidence.

  • Kerberoast
  • ESC1 / ESC8
  • Delegation
  • PCI DSS 4.0
  • SWIFT CSP
Telecom · Public SectorRecurring assessments

Telecom carrier & government bodies

Recurring external and internal penetration tests, web and API assessments, and social-engineering campaigns; on-call incident response and threat-hunting support during active intrusions.

  • External / internal
  • Web & API
  • Social eng.
  • IR on-call
AI · Emerging RiskAI red team

Production LLM deployments

Adversarial testing of live LLM and agentic systems: direct and indirect prompt injection through RAG corpora, tool-calling abuse, guardrail bypass chains, system-prompt and training-data leakage, unbounded-consumption abuse — mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS.

  • Indirect injection
  • Tool abuse
  • Guardrail bypass
  • ATLAS
— EXPERIENCE · git log --graph

A career as a commit history.

Three roles run in parallel — a US research platform, a security consultancy I lead technically, and a startup I co-founded. Expand any commit.

ninou@bellounis: ~/career git log --oneline --graph --all
  1. f0a5511 (HEAD → main) Senior Offensive Security Consultant — Infrastructure, Web & AI — Systelium Oct 2025 — present · contract · West Africa
    • Full-scope penetration testing across complex enterprise architectures — Active Directory, middleware ESB platforms, cloud-hosted web applications and AI/LLM systems — for large industrial groups operating across West Africa.
    • Infrastructure & Active Directory — multi-segment enterprise networks, identity and authentication layers.
    • Middleware & API — ESB platforms, Apache Karaf / JMX services, JDBC and multi-tier data layers.
    • Web applications — modern stacks including Blazor / .NET, Azure App Service and OIDC / PKCE authentication flows.
    • AI & LLM security — enterprise AI platforms, model and multi-tenant boundaries.
    • End-to-end delivery — structured multi-phase methodology, professional HTML reporting, and remediation retesting with finding-lifecycle tracking — across sensitive multi-database estates (HR, payroll, sales) and critical infrastructure under strict confidentiality.
    Active Directory · Kerberos / NTLM · Apache Karaf / JMX · ESB middleware · JDBC · Blazor / .NET · Azure App Service · OIDC / PKCE · Enterprise LLM platforms
  2. a7f3c21 CISO — Chief Information Security Officer — Kyo Conseil Jul 2019 — present · Algiers
    • Own the company's security strategy, architecture and technical direction as CISO; direct a team of 15+ engineers across offensive security, DevSecOps, infrastructure and software.
    • Stood up the SOC capability from zero: SIEM across 500+ endpoints, ATT&CK-mapped detection content and Sigma rules, alert triage workflow and IR runbooks.
    • Replaced legacy VPN with Zero Trust network access — identity-aware per-application authorization, device posture, mTLS for internal systems.
    • Design and operate a multi-datacenter virtualization estate with ZFS storage, immutable backups and tested disaster recovery.
    • Built and run a production multi-tenant SaaS platform with OS-level tenant isolation across thousands of accounts.
    • Own vendor security review, client-facing assurance and audit readiness (ISO 27001 / NIST CSF aligned).
    Wazuh · Elastic · Sigma · MITRE ATT&CK · Cloudflare Zero Trust · Proxmox VE · ZFS · Docker · Terraform · Ansible · Nginx · MySQL · GitLab CI/CD
  3. 9d2e154 Security Researcher — Synack Jun 2021 — present · Remote
    • Discovered and disclosed 150+ critical and high-severity vulnerabilities, including zero-days, across enterprise web, API, mobile and cloud-native targets on the vetted Synack Red Team researcher platform.
    • AI/ML attack-surface research — prompt injection, indirect injection via retrieval, agent tool abuse, model behaviour manipulation and data leakage against production LLM deployments.
    • Assessed Kubernetes clusters, serverless stacks and microservice estates for IAM privilege escalation, container escape, exposed control planes and CI/CD supply-chain exposure.
    • Built custom recon, fuzzing and exploitation tooling in Python, Go and Rust where off-the-shelf scanners stop short — auth bypass, deserialisation, business-logic abuse.
    • Reproducible, developer-ready reports with working PoCs; remediation support and retest cycles.
    Burp Suite Pro · Nuclei · Impacket · BloodHound · Sliver · Semgrep · Python / Go / Rust · AWS · Azure · GCP · Kubernetes · OWASP LLM Top 10 · MITRE ATLAS
  4. 6b8a432 Senior Cybersecurity Specialist — Red Team — Kyo Conseil Sep 2017 — Jul 2019 · Algiers
    • Led red team and penetration test delivery for banking, oil & gas, telecom and government clients — external, internal, assumed-breach, phishing and physical/social engineering.
    • Mapped and exploited Active Directory attack paths to domain compromise, then ran purple team replays with client blue teams to build and validate detections.
    • Designed Zero Trust and micro-segmented architectures for enterprise and regulated deployments.
    • Embedded security into delivery: SAST, DAST, dependency and secret scanning in CI/CD, SIEM detection libraries, threat-hunting playbooks.
    • Presented findings to C-level stakeholders and regulators.
    Cobalt Strike · Metasploit · Impacket · BloodHound · Responder · Nmap · Burp Suite · Wazuh · Zero Trust · DevSecOps · Incident Response
  5. 3f7e981 (tag: best-startup-2016) Co-Founder / CTO — Dalil Technology Jan 2013 — present · Algiers
    • Grew the company from two people to 50+; won Best Startup Algeria 2016 at Seedstars.
    • Architected a cloud-native SaaS platform serving 10,000+ users — event-driven microservices on AWS and GCP, secure-by-design with threat modelling and least-privilege IAM.
    • Shipped AI/ML product features (NLP, computer vision, recommendation) and led blockchain R&D including audited Ethereum smart contracts.
    Next.js · FastAPI · PostgreSQL · Redis · Kubernetes · AWS · GCP · Terraform · Solidity
  6. 1c4d762 IT Manager — Eprint Dec 2015 — Aug 2017 · Algiers
    • Owned the full IT estate — Windows Server, Active Directory, Linux, Cisco networking, VPN, backup and DR.
    • Hardened the perimeter, managed firewall policy, ran company-wide security awareness and phishing simulations.
    Windows Server · Active Directory · VMware · Cisco · Linux
  7. 0000000 (root) Initial commit — CTF circuit, Mozilla Reps, GDG speaker 2011 — 2014
    • Security career is self-taught and competition-forged: CTF circuit 2014–2018, then professional red team delivery.
    • Mozilla Foundation Representative 2015–2019 (Reps Alumni); Google Developer Groups member & speaker 2011–2014.
    • BSc Architecture & Urban Arts, University of Chlef, 2012–2015 — which is why the reports have decent typography.
— SHIPPED & LIVE

Products people use,
not side-project screenshots.

Security tooling shipped end to end — design, build, hardening, hosting. All three are live right now; click through.

— RESEARCH & TOOLING

Tools written because
the scanner stopped short.

Open-source where possible, internal where it has to be. Star counts are pulled live from GitHub.

View all repositories ↗
Go★ —

TraceLess

What could a low-privileged attacker harvest from this host right now? Read-only /proc introspection with 30+ rules for credentials leaked in process environments and command lines — DB, cloud, JWT keys, OAuth, Stripe/Slack/GitHub tokens — needless root, and 0.0.0.0 binds. Severity-scored, JSON for CI, single static binary.

Go 1.21 · /proc · rule engine · JSON · MIT
TypeScript★ —

Uptiq

Self-hosted status page and incident platform that closes the detection-to-resolution loop: a processor engine evaluates alert rules every 30s, auto-opens incidents on breach, deduplicates, auto-resolves on recovery. Agent telemetry, SSE, Discord/Slack/email/webhook dispatch.

Next.js 14 · Express · PostgreSQL 16 · SSE · Docker
TypeScript★ —

ProxmoxGuru

Cross-platform desktop client for Proxmox VE — multi-cluster nodes, VMs, LXC, storage, backups, live task streams. Security-first: credentials encrypted at rest via OS keychain and never exposed to the renderer, scoped API tokens, context isolation on, per-server TLS verification.

Electron · React 18 · Vite · Tailwind · GitHub Actions
Pythoninternal

AI-Powered SOC

Security operations pipeline where LLMs correlate SIEM alerts, enrich with threat intelligence, map activity to MITRE ATT&CK and draft incident-response playbooks — cutting L1 triage load on repetitive alerts, running inside a working SOC.

Python · Claude API · LangChain · Elasticsearch · Wazuh · FastAPI
Pythoninternal

ServerScope

Agentless asset and attack-surface discovery across Linux (SSH), Windows (WinRM), Active Directory (LDAP), VMware, Proxmox and AWS/Azure/GCP — surfaces shadow IT, abandoned and unpatched hosts, and risk-scores each asset.

Python 3.14 · Pydantic · SSH / WinRM · LDAP · cloud APIs · pytest
Chardware

ClaudeMon

Flipper Zero application (C, FAP SDK) mirroring live AI-agent session events over USB serial, with D-pad approval of privileged tool calls — out-of-band, human-in-the-loop control for autonomous agents.

C · Flipper FAP SDK · Python · USB serial · ufbt
— COMPETITIVE SECURITY

Nine podiums.
Your turn.

The CTF circuit is where this career started. Left: the record. Right: a five-question clearance check for recruiters — pass it and unlock a flag (and a shortcut to my calendar).

scoreboard 2014 — 2018
  1. 1stSICA CTF — Algerian Ministry of National Defense national2018
  2. 2ndCSAW MENA Finals — NYU Abu Dhabi2018
  3. 1stCSAW Qualification — NYU Tandon, New York2017
  4. 2ndCSAW Qualification — NYU Tandon, New York2016
  5. 3rdCSAW Finals — NYU Abu Dhabi2016
  6. 1stBSides Algiers CTF — back-to-back champion2015 · 16
  7. 1stHack.INI CTF — ESI Algiers2014
  8. 2ndBSides Algiers CTF2014
  9. 1stBest Startup Algeria — Seedstars entrepreneurship2016
clearance-check 0 / 5
— HIDDEN FLAGS

Five flags are hidden on this site. 0 / 5 found.

Some are handed to you, some you must submit. Hints: read the source, open the console, ask the robots, finish the clearance check, and remember the 1986 cheat code.

  • console
  • cheat code
  • sudo
  • clearance
  • robots
— STACK

Offense-grade
security toolkit.

OFFENSIVE
Red TeamingAdversary EmulationWeb / API / Mobile / Cloud PentestAD & ADCS Attack PathsExploit DevelopmentSocial EngineeringCobalt StrikeSliverMythicBurp Suite ProImpacketBloodHoundMetasploitNucleiGhidra
AI SECURITY
LLM & Agent Red-TeamingDirect & Indirect Prompt InjectionRAG PoisoningTool-Calling AbuseModel ExtractionGuardrail EvaluationOWASP LLM Top 10MITRE ATLASNIST AI RMFEU AI ActPyRITGarak
DEFENSIVE
WazuhElasticSigmaMITRE ATT&CKThreat HuntingDFIREDR TuningPurple TeamingAtomic Red TeamCalderaThreat Intel
CLOUD & INFRA
AWSAzureGCPKubernetesDockerTerraformAnsibleProxmox VEZFSCloudflare Zero TrustIstioNginxGitLab CI/CDSBOM
OT / ICS
IEC 62443Purdue ModelSCADA / DCS reviewModbusDNP3IT/OT boundary
ENGINEERING
PythonGoRustTypeScriptBashPowerShellFastAPINext.jsNode.jsSolidityPostgreSQLRedis
NETWORKING
BGPOSPFWireGuardIPSecPalo AltoFortinetCisco802.11SDNMicro-segmentation
FRAMEWORKS
MITRE ATT&CKNIST CSF & 800-53ISO 27001CIS ControlsNIS2DORATIBER-EUPCI DSS 4.0SWIFT CSPSOC 2GDPRHIPAA
— CERTIFICATIONS & TRAINING
  • Cybrary career-path training, 2019 — CISSP · CCSP · SSCP · CompTIA Security+ · CISO (exam-preparation coursework)
  • Scrum Fundamentals Certified — SCRUMstudy / VMEdu, 2019 (expired 2022)
  • Zend PHP Certified Engineer — Zend Technologies, 2011 (expired 2013)
— EDUCATION & COMMUNITY
  • BSc Architecture & Urban Arts — University of Chlef, 2012 — 2015
  • Mozilla Foundation — Mozilla Representative, 2015 — 2019 · Reps Alumni
  • Google Developer Groups — Member & Speaker, 2011 — 2014
  • Languages — Arabic native · French C1/C2 · English professional
— ABOUT

I work where systems get
compromised or defended.

My work sits at the boundary between the attacker and the defender: Active Directory and identity, cloud control planes, the LLM prompt surface, SIEM telemetry, Zero Trust perimeters — and the leadership work of running the team that owns all of it. Based in Algiers, fluent in French and English, available for on-site, hybrid or fully remote roles in Europe, the Gulf and North America.

PGP / Signal on request · security.txt